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THE KURDS

Charles G. MacDonald
Florida International University
The Middle East is wrought with the passions of burgeoning nationalisms, religious fervor, ethnic conflict, and external intervention, as well as the more mundane struggle over land
and resources. The aspirations of Pan-Arab unity and Pan-Islam
face a subjective reality of a Middle Eastern mosaic of peoples
artificially divided into a modern state system, with states jealously guarding their vested interests. National boundaries, although tested by expansionist states pressing historical and sometimes, religious claims, are proving to be resilient, but not always
immutable. Similarly, the nationalist aspirations of ethnic and
religious minorities within the Middle Eastern states face the
vested interests of their host states, which have a propensity to
preserve the status quo and a reluctance to relinquish sovereignty
or share power. The aspiration of national self-determination that
emerged as a prominent milieu goal in the post-colonial world is
often championed by the United Nations, and is repeatedly voiced
in the Middle East. National self-determination sought by religious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East, however, is
undermined by transnational religious movements; is too often
the victim of the national interests of both Middle Eastern states
and outside powers; and is repeatedly sacrificed to the exigencies
of internal security and regional stability.
As the Middle East moves into the 1990s, ethnic and
religious nationalists, wedded to national liberation movements,
appear destined to repeat their frustrations. They not on! y struggle
among themselves and are repressed by their host states, but are
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also manipulated by opportunistic outside parties. The tragic
experience of the Kurdish people in the Middle East represents the
classic example of the denial of national self-determination following the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish
experience illustrates the problems faced by a "stateless nation," 1
by "a people without a country," 2 artificially divided by state
boundaries and otherwise separated by history. The Kurds are the
largest national group in the Middle East without a state.
ETHNIC IDENTITY
The Kurdish people, an Indo-European people, are the
fourth largest national or ethnic group in the Middle East after the
Arabs, Turks, and Iranians, but have no state. Believed to be
descendants of the ancient Medes, 3 Kurds today number over
20,000,0004and primarily reside in a single parcel of land known
as Greater Kurdistan. This Kurdish land is about 500,000-520,000
square kilometers in area and is divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq,
Syria, and the Soviet Union. Kurds generally refer to Greater
Kurdistan as the "the five parts" or"the five sections," rather than
as a single entity or unified whole. 5 Additionally, Kurdish expatriot populations have emerged in Lebanon and in Europe, particularly in Germany and Sweden.
Kurds historically were considered to be non-Arab nomads
and were often thought of as being warriors or warlike. 6 However,
they were not viewed as a separate ethnic group within the Middle
East. Instead, they were simply seen as Moslems. The millet
system that developed in the Middle East even before Islam and
was adopted by the Ottoman Empire, was based upon religion.
Nomenclature
Today Kurds are commonly know by several names. In
Turkey, Kurds are commonly referred to as "Mountain Turks,"
but there appears to be a growing acknowledgement of the
Kurdish identity. Previously, reference to Turkish Kurds in Turkey was potentially punishable by imprisonment. In Iran Kurds
are generally seen as an Iranian people, having many cultural
characteristics in common with Persians, such as the important
Now Ruz celebration . Another name associated with Kurds is
"Pesh Merga," which refers to the Kurdish guerrillas or fighters
and literally means "those who face death."
Another aspect of the Kurdish identity is the relationship
of Kurds to other minority groups found in Kurdistan. For example, some Kurdish areas include Christians, such as Assyrians
and Armenians, as well as Jews. It is not uncommon to see these
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groups casually included as Kurds in Kurdish population figures.
Moreover, the expression, "Kurdish Jews," is frequently used to
refer to Jews from Kurdish areas. 7 ln Israel, sometimes the use of
the word, "Kurds," refers to the Jews from Kurdish areas of Iraq,
especially as have settled in Jerusalem. Also, some Kurdish
nationalists have variously included Lurs and Bakhtiari as Kurds,
even though the Lurs and Bakhtiari might disagree. The secretive
Druze community in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel reportedly are
sometimes linked with the Kurdish lands. 8
Historical Developments
Greater Kurdistan is today divided among Turkey, Iran,
Iraq, Syria, and the Soviet Union. The national (state) boundaries
that divide Greater Kurdistan were primarily derived from the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The first
division of the Kurdish region, however, dates back to the sixteenth century clash between the Safavid or Persian Empire and
the Ottoman Empire. The famous historical battle of Caldiran,
August 23, 1514, served to establish probably the first division of
the Kurdish lands, as Kurdistan became caught in the throes of
more than a century long struggle between the two powerful
empires. Mem .lJ.Zin, the epic work of the seventeenth century
Kurdish poet, Ehmed-i Xani, captures the plight of the Kurdish
peoples caught between the Ottomans and the Persians. The epic
expresses a longing for a Kurdish king and a Kurdish kingdom,
thus anticipating the twentieth century concept of national selfdetermination by over three hundred years. 9
The 1639 Ottoman-Persian treaty signaled the establishment of a lasting partition of Kurdistan between the Ottomans
(Turks) and the Persians. 10 It was the subsequent twentieth century European division of the Ottoman Empire following World
War I that contributed to a much greater fragmentation of the
Kurdish region and to the predicament the Kurds find themselves
today. While the promise of Kurdish self-determination did
appear to a degree in the Treaty of Sevres after World War I, Kurds
were initially to be offered only "local autonomy" (article 62) in
an area that had been part of the Ottoman Empire, with the
possibility of independence after one year only if the majority of
the Kurdish population wanted independence and the League
Council then recommended independence (article 64). 11 The
Treaty of Sevres was never ratified by the Turkish Grand National
Assembly, however, and was eventually replaced with the Lausanne Treaty of January 23, 1923, primarily due to the emergent
Turkish nationalism and the efforts of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
The Lausanne Treaty entirely omitted the earlier treaty's provi123

sion for an autonomous Kurdistan 12 and dashed Kurdish hopes for
self-determination that had been articulated so eloquently three
centuries earlier by Ehmed-i Xani. 13 It was the boundaries based
upon the Lausanne Treaty that divided the Kurdish people and
resulted in separate national experiences for the Kurdish communities in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Soviet Union.
POLITICAL DEMANDS: DISPARATE NATIONAL GOALS
The state boundaries and separate national development
experiences of the Kurds in the five states in which Greater
Kurdistan lies have had a significant impact on Kurdish political
goals, and have created unsurpassable barriers to Kurdish national
unity. The effect of the separate national experiences of the five
Kurdish "parts" offers lessons not only for contemporary Kurdish
nationalists, but also for other nationalist groups that find themselves artificially divided by state boundaries. The obstacles to
Kurdish national unity, as evident in the twentieth century Kurdish experience fall into three interrelated issue areas: problems of
communication, problems of common political action, and problems of external influence and manipulation. Problems of communication and problems of common political action relate to the
lasting effect of separate Kurdish national experiences within the
respective host states which control the Kurdish areas and the
ultimate parameters for pressing Kurdish political demands. The
related problems of external influence and manipulation impact
not only on the efficacy of obtaining national goals, but also on
regional stability.
Perhaps one of the key factors affecting Kurdish nationalism and one of the biggest obstacles to Kurdish national unification involves the inability Kurds to communicate easily with
Kurds in other areas. A common language is a basic common
denominator of any national movement, and no single, recognized
spoken or written Kurdish language has emerged, current efforts
to systematize the Kurdish language notwithstanding. 14 The problem of communication is significant not only between Kurdish
groups in different states, but also between Kurdish groups in
different parts of the same state. As one scholar points out, "Of all
the major nationalities in the Middle East, only the Kurds have yet
to adopt a standard language, commonly accepted and learned by
all branches of the nation." 15
Problems in Communications
In Iran, the Kurdish population is placed at just over 5
million or about 9 percent of the population. 16 Kurdistan in Iran
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lies along the Turkish-Iranian border and along the upper part of
the Iraqi-Iranian border. Kurdistan in Iran extends well beyond
the Kurdistan province. In addition, there is a significant Kurdish
population in Khorasan province, dating from the 1600s. Also,
numerous Kurds have gravitated to Tehran and other urban
centers.
In Iran there are two principal forms of spoken KurdishKurdi and Gorani. 17 Each has numerous dialects. The Kurdish
dialects in the northern, central, and southeastern parts of Kurdistan in Iran show varying degrees of commonality, but do present
significant communication problems among Iranian Kurds. 18 The
Kurdish language, being an Indo-European language, parallels
Persian (Farsi), but is distinct from Persian even though it shares
many common words and phrases. It also reflects significant
Arabic influences. The study of Kurdish, however, has not been
permitted in Iranian schools, though it is widely spoken in the
Kurdish community. 19 In other words, while Kurdish was spoken
in Kurdish homes, Persian was the language Kurdish children
learned to read and write. The study of Kurdish was officially
banned under the Shah; Kurdish schools were forbidden. Radio
stations, however, did broadcast in Kurdish, but ofter to legitimize
the Shah's regime. Moreover, the broadcasts asserted that Kurdish was a dialect of Persian.
The Islamic Republic's constitution, as initially approved,
provided in article 15 that the official language of Iran is Persian
and that all official documents, correspondence, and textbooks
must be in Persian. 20 However, the use of local and nationality
languages would be allowed in the press and media. The teaching
of literature in local languages, along with Persian was also to be
permitted. 21 The original Draft Constitution provided in article 21
that "the use of local languages in local schools and press is
permitted," 22 but the Constitution as finally approved restricted
the use oflocal languages to accompany Farsi and expressly stated
that textbooks must be in Farsi. The new Constitution appeared to
offer bilingual schools, a step away from the strict prohibition of
the Kurdish language under the Shah. Nevertheless, practice
remained virtually unchanged, as illustrated by the clandestine
National Voice of Iran in January 1984. It asserted that the study
of "English, Arabic, and other foreign languages was made
"compulsory for the peoples of Kurdistan" and that the Islamic
Republic had "banned or made impossible education in the
mother tongue. " 23 As one young Kurdish intellectual explained,
"we are allowed to publish in Kurdish, but we are forbidden to
publish in Kurdish."
Despite the limitations on the use of Kurdish throughout
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the Kurdish areas of Iran, the Sorani dialect has emerged as the
predominate dialect used in radio broadcasts and in Kurdish
publications. 24 The Kurdish Democratic Party (Iran) does radio
broadcasts via the Voice of Kurdistan in Kurdish (and also in
Azeri and Farsi). Komale, or the Communist Party of Iran (CPI)
also has broadcast in Kurdish and Farsi over the Voice of the
Revolution of Iran. While the Kurdish language is recognized as
a national symbol, communication problems persist. Other major
Kurdish dialects include Kurmanci in the north and northeast;
Sinei, Kermansahi, and Leki in the south; Zaza in the north; and
Gorani in the south, among others. 25
In Iraq the Kurdish population is about 15-20 percent of
the population, or possibly as high as about 3.8 million. 26 Kurds
are situated in the mountainous northeastern part of Iraq. An
"Autonomous Region" was established as a separate administrative entity in Iraq following the March 11, 1970 Agreement and
the Autonomy Law of 1974. However, not all Kurdish areas are
included in the Autonomous Region. Kirkuk, for example, has a
significant Kurdish population.
The official language of Iraq is Arabic, but Kurdish is
also considered to be an official language for the Autonomous
Region. Kurds generally speak both Arabic and Kurdish in Iraq.
The Kurdish language has flourished in Iraq since the 1958
revolution. 27 In Iraq four main forms of Kurdish exist, but are not
mutually intelligible. 28 Kurmanji is spoken in the north above
Mosul, but has no literature. Sorani is spoken in the Irbil province,
but the closely-related Sulaimani Kurdish has been considered
"the language of Kurdish literature and the printed word." 29
Today, Sorani (or Kurdi) has effectively become the official
Kurdish language used in government and taught in schools. The
fourth dialect, Gorani, is spoken by the southernmost Kurdish
tribes, and by some of the more unusual Kurdish groups, including
minor Islamic sects, such as the Sarlis, Kakais, and Shebeks. 30
The Kurdish population in Turkey is difficult to assess
because of the past Turkish Government's past aversion to viewing Kurds as a separate ethnic/national group. Conservative
estimates place the Kurdish population at about 12% of the total
Turkish population, or just over 6.8 million. 31 Other estimates
frequently place the Kurdish population in Turkey as high as 18%
of the total. 32 Kurds primarily live in eastern Turkey, but the
migration of Kurds to urban areas has brought Kurds to all major
cities. Since the Turkish Government has a history of considering
Kurds as Turks, Kurds have generally been afforded the same
rights as Turks, but language has been a significant problem.
Kurds have been forced to use the Turkish language in
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schools. Turkish, a Ural-Altaic language, is quite different from
the Indo-European Kurdish. Moreover, since November 1928,
Turkey has used the Latin or Roman alphabet instead of the Arabic
alphabet. 33 The imposition of the Latin alphabet by law served to
limit severely the ability of Turkish Kurds to read Kurdish
materials published in Iran or Iraq. Similarly, Kurds in Iran have
great difficulty reading Kurdish in the Latin script. Kurds in
Turkey primarily speak the Kunnanji dialect and use the Hawar
(Turcized Latin) characters, but the Zaza dialect is also spoken,
such as in Dersim. 34 One Kurdish scholar, Kendal, charged that
the Kurdish language became a target in Turkey for those want to
destroy the Kurdish national community. 35 Under Kemalism,
Turkey not only banned the written use of Kurdish, but also its
spoken use, even though only a small percentage of Kurds could
speak Turkish. In the Kurdish community, a language that one
does not understand, is commonly considered to be "Turkish." In
modern Turkey the 1982 Turkish Constitution continues to prohibit the use of Kurdish, 36 but the Turkish Council of Ministers,
under the chairmanship of President Turgut Ozal announced that
it would abolish Law 2932, enacted in 1983 which bans nonTurkish languages in Turkey. The Council of Ministers made the
dramatic move January 26, 1991, and called for the Justice
Ministry to prepare a new bill. 37 Such an action might eventually
lead to the legalization of the use of Kurdish in Turkey.
In Syria, the Kurdish population represents only about
8% 38 of the total population or about 998,675 out of 12,483,440. 39
The Kurdish communities are primarily found in three areas.
First, the largest Kurdish community is in northern Jazira in
northeastern Syria near the Turkish and Iraqi border, with smaller
concentrations in northwest Jazira and in Kurd Dagh, northwest
of Allepo. 40 Although some speak Kurdish, most are "Arabicisized" and are assimilated into the local Arab culture, but not
without some tension. 41
Kurmanji Kurdish is the primary dialect spoken in Syria,
and Kurdish communities tend to use Hawar, the Latin alphabet
used by the Turks. Kurdish language and cultural activities were
the target of radical Baa th Arab nationalist pressures in the 1960s.
The intensity of the Baath attack on the Syrian Kurds is illustrated
by Mahamed Talab Hilal 's 1963 "Study of the Province of Jazireh
in its National, Social and Political Aspects," described by a
leading Kurdish intellectual as "a mere invitation to genocide in
the kind of Mein Kampf. 42 The Syrian Government's harsh
Arabization of some Kurdish areas in Syria and other antiKurdish repressive acts gave way after the 1970s to more a more
accommodating policy, especially after Saddam Hussein came
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into power in Iraq.
The 1989 official Soviet census places the Kurdish
population in the Soviet Union at 153,000, but Soviet Kurds
estimate the Kurdish population to be much greater, possibly over
500,000. 43 Kurds historically settled in the Transcaucasus region.
An autonomous Kurdish region, "Red Kurdistan, " existed in
Soviet Azerbaijan from 1923 through 1929. Kurds were dispersed
to Central Asia by Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s. Kurds now are
found in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics as well as in
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
Kurds in the Soviet Union find it difficult to communicate with other Kurds because Stalin dispersed so many of them
throughout Central Asia. The linguistic factor also comes into
play, especially since the alphabet has complicated comprehension. In the 1920s a Kurdish alphabet that employed Armenian
characters was developed in the Kurdish areas of the Soviet
Union. After 1929 the Latin alphabet came to be used. 45 In the
1930s the Cyrillic alphabet was adopted and the new emphasis on
Russian meant less opportunities in Kurdish schools. The Kurdish
autonomous district created in Soviet Azerbaijan ceased to exist
in 1930. It was not until the late 1950s that Soviet nationalities
policy again fostered the use of local languages, and the Kurdish
language reemerged. 46 Kurmanji is the predominant Kurdish
dialect in the Soviet Union. However, Kurmanji uses Cyrillic
script, which is not readily understood by non-Soviet Kurds.
Problems of Common Political Action
The lack of both a common language and common alphabet represents a significant inhibitor to communication and to the
creation of common Kurdish political goals. The inability of
Kurds to communicate readily represents a significant barrier to
any Kurdish national unification. This lack of effective communication, in turn, has led to Kurdish nationalists developing
separately within theirrespective host states. The goals sought are
not goals of Greater Kurdistan or of the Kurdish nation as a whole,
but narrower, perceived goals linked to the separate Kurdish
experiences and aspirations. Kurdish nationalist goals range from
preserving the Kurdish culture and language, to autonomy or selfrule in a larger state, to the establishment of an independent
Kurdistan.
The problem of goal selection, as clouded by ideology,
religion, vested interests, and degree of assimilation in host states,
further complicates the possibility of a common political action
not only among Kurdish nationalists in general, but also within
Kurdish areas of their respective host states. Moreover, the actions
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of the host states can serve to be divisive, as Kurdish groups are
played off against one another or co-opted to support the central
government of the host state at the expense of Kurdish national
goals. National liberation movements are sometimes viewed as
having a common goals, but in disagreement on how best to
achieve those goals. In the Kurdish case there is no common goal.
Greater Kurdistan remains a Kurdistan of five parts.
In Iran Kurds are one minority in a country of minorities.
Reza Shah's efforts to enhance national unity by changing the
name of Persia to Iran enabled the non-Persian peoples, including
Kurds, to see themselves as Iranians. Accordingly, Kurds on the
whole have not been excluded from individual opportunities of
full participation within Iranian society. Many Kurds have been
individually assimilated and have assumed prominent positions in
the Iranian government through the years. Nevertheless, Kurdistan in Iran is rural and remote and tends to be separated geographically, culturally, and politically from the Iranian central government.47
In Iranian Kurdistan, Kurdish goals have been primarily
expressed from a leftist perspective, responding to class differences and, in no small way, to vested interests of tribal leaders who
have cooperated closely with the central government over the
years. Modem Kurdish political organization in Iran dates from
the Kurdish Democratic Party (Iran) founded under the leadership
of Qazi Mohammad. The Kurdish nationalist aspirations, though
often assessed by the central government as being secessionist or
separatist, have been generally limited to self-rule within a democratic Iran. "Democracy in Iran and Autonomy in Kurdistan" has
been the ongoing goal of the Kurds in Iran. Even the so-called
independent Kurdish Republic of Mahabad 48had been calling for
a form of autonomy within Iran. Qazi Mohammed's Kurdish
Democratic Party (Iran) put forth an eight-point program which
first and foremost asserted: "the Kurdish people of Iran must
manage their own local affairs and be granted autonomy within
Iran's frontiers." 49Qazi Mohammad declared the "State of the
Kurdish Republic" on January 22, 1946, but whether he was
establishing an "autonomous regional government" or a "fully
independent republic" was never resolved because of the fall of
his "republic.'•So
The Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party's goal of autonomy continued for decades under the leadership of the late Dr.
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and was reflected in the slogan,
"Autonomy in Kurdistan, democracy in Iran." The Kurdish goal
of autonomy or self-rule in Iran has remained consistent over the
years despite accusations of separatism. Although the goal of
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democracy was not acceptable to the Shah orto Ayatollah Khomeini
and the Islamic Republic, Dr. Ghassemlou remained genuine in
his efforts to pursue autonomy within Iran. Even when Dr.
Ghassemlou was assassinated in July 1989, he was undertaking
secret negotiations with the Islamic Republic to repair relations
with Tehran. 51
In addition to the Kurdish Democratic Party (Iran), other
Kurdish political organizations, have pushed for democracy and
autonomy, the most notable being Komala or its follow-on
Communist Party oflran. Although the Kurdish Democratic Party
and Komala did not always agree on policy, cooperation has been
significant. 52 Other leftest-oriented organizations, such as,
Mojahedin Khalq, People's Fedayeen, and the Tudeh, have included Kurds and have stood together with the Kurdish Democratic Party (Iran) against the forces of Zionism, imperialism, and
reaction.
In Kurdistan in Iran, Kurds represent a rural, underdeveloped, dispossessed people, who are struggling to survive. Their
perspective, as that of many Third World peoples, is limited to
their own isolated experience. Their isolation, together with the
weight of their leftist ideology, has severely limited their world
view.
In Iraq, Kurds represent a minority associated with a
portion of Greater Kurdistan that falls in the northern part of Iraq.
The Kurdish experience in Iraq is fundamentally different from
that in Iran and offers great contrasts. 53 Many Kurds have been
fully integrated into Iraqi society and have reached the highest
positions of power. 54 Kurds participate fully in the military (unlike
the Arab citizens in Israel). Kurdish language and education is
allowed. Iraq's response to its Kurdish community varies considerably, however. Kurdish opposition groups confronting the Iraqi
central government, have experienced, inter alia, the horrors of
genocide, chemical attacks, destruction of villages, and wholescale population transfers. Kurds were tragic victims of chemical
attacks at Halabja on March 16, 1988,55 and of the so-called "war
of extermination" in the fall of 1988.56 In the past, a ruthless move
by the central government has been followed by some form of
amnesty, such as for military deserters or Kurdish guerrillas.
Iraq's carrot-and-stick approach to the Kurds has enabled some
Kurds to be co-opted and others intimidated.
Politically, Kurds were a big loser after World War I
when the Treaty of Sevres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, and legal provisions for an independent Kurdistan (after
one year) were lost. Only after years of struggle did the Iraqi Kurds
eventually reach an agreement with the central government in
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Baghdad in March 1970. The Autonomy Law of 1974 that was
subsequently negotiated supposedly was less than the Kurdish
rebels anticipated, and the Kurdish insurrection was renewed. The
Iraqi Kurds, however, fell victim to international political machinations when Iraq signed the 1975 Algiers Accord with Iran and
outside aid (from Iran, the United States, and Israel) 57 to the Kurds
was abruptly stopped and the border with Iran closed. The Kurds
were trapped and defeated. Iran had agreed to prohibit Kurdish
transborder activities and had removed the sanctuary for Iraqi
Kurds.
Later, the Iranian revolution so weakened the Iranian
military's ability to police the border that Kurds again began to
take advantage of the situation for cross border activities. Shortly
thereafter, the Iran-Iraq War again encouraged the Kurds to seek
their goal of "democracy in Iraq and autonomy for the Kurds"
while the Iraqi forces were weakened.
During and in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, the
Kurdish Democratic Party (Iraq), under Masoud Barzani, and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, under Jalal Talabani, entered into
numerous national front organizations and shifting alignments
with a variety of opposition groups seeking to overthrow the
Baath regime in Baghdad. 58 Similarly, following the expulsion of
Iraqi forces from Kuwait by the United States-led coalition,
another heterogeneous grouping of anti-Saddam Hussein organizations gathered in Lebanon in March 199 I. The opposition
groups similarly called for democracy in Iraq, but not without
significant political differences emerging between the leftist/
communist groups and the Islamic groups. The weakened, disorganized state of the Iraqi military suggests that Saddam Hussein
(and any post-Saddam Baathist regime) will face a renewed
insurgency on the part of the Kurds. Any significant success on the
part of the Kurds, could result in new political demands for an
independent Kurdistan, contrary to the joint goals of the national
front groupings.
Kurds are not a recognized minority in Turkey, but
populate much of the Eastern portion of the state, and are found in
the urban areas. The degree of assimilation of the Sunni Kurds into
Turkish society is debatable. Kurds have the same rights as other
Turkish nationals, but lack recognition as an ethnic entity and are
denied a right of national self-determination. 59 Kurds working
within the Turkish political system reportedly can rise to prominence,(,()but as Helsinki Watch points out, Turkey has also worked
to destroy the Kurdish ethnic identity. 61
Unlike the Kurds in Iraq and Iran who have generally
been seeking autonomy, the leading Kurdish party in Turkey, the
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.Kurdish Workers Party or Partia Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),
openly advocates Kurdish independence. PKK General Secretary
Abdallah Ocalan, the recognized head of PKK, in an interview
with Die Zeit charged that other Kurdish leaders call for only
autonomy to protect their feudal interests while the PKK calls for
independence. 62 Ocalan, who founded the PKK in 1978, asserts
that the future government and social system of a free Kurdistan
will be decided by the Kurdish people. The PKK, however, claims
to be Marxist-Leninist.
Other Kurdish political groups in Turkey include, inter
alia, the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (SPTK), the Revo1utionary Democrats (DDKD) the Kurdish Vanguard Workers
Party (PPKK), and the National Liberation of Kurdistan (KUK). 63
The SPKT has cooperated with various other Kurdish groups, but
has been at odds with the PKK. It envisions a workable federation
with Turkey which the PKK does not accept. The Revolutionary
Democrats, linked with the PPKK, clearly has Marxist leanings.
The PPKK and the KUK is known to have cooperated with the
SPTK. The KUK also is linked to the KDP (Iraq). The differing
Kurdish coalitions aside, the significant difference between the
Turkish Kurds, as reflected in the radical PKK, is the call for
independence.
In Syria the Kurds are the largest ethnic minority. The
Kurdish presence dates back to the Crusades. The Kurdish people,
however, have not been formally recognized as a national minority by the Syrian Arab Republic's 1973 Constitution. Unlike
Armenians, who have been granted religious and cultural rights,
Kurds are generally treated as other Moslems and tend to be
integrated into Syrian society. The Kurdish Democratic Pary
(Syria) was established in 1957 .64 It did not seek independence or
even autonomy for the Kurdish areas of Syria. Instead, it sought
more mundane linguistic and cultural rights, economic support,
and a move toward democracy.
The relatively small and dispersed Kurdish population in
the Soviet Union would not tend to suggest political action.
However, in the days of Glasnost and while the Soviet Union is
facing an uncertain future, possibly even a breakup into independent republics, Kurdish nationalism has reemerged. In July 1990,
the first congress of Soviet Kurds was convened in Moscow. The
congress, under the leadership of Karim Nadirov, adopted a
resolution calling for the establishment of an autonomous region
in Soviet Kurdistan (in Soviet Azerbaijan).
RESOLUTION: OUTLOOK FOR POLITICAL GOALS
In Iran the Kurdish attempt to achieve autonomy or self132

rule was harshly put down by Ayatollah Khomeini's forces . Even
though Iranian Kurds under Ghassemlou's leader hip attempted
to explain publicly that they were not separatists and were not
seeking independence, they were identified as separatists or
traitors, and brutally defeated. The Kurds found they could not
hold cities and could not compete with the technologically superior government forces , especially forces using air power. The
Kurdish gains made at the beginning of the Iranian Revolution
were quickly reversed . The Iranian Kurds were decimated. In July
1989, when Ghassemlou, representing a greatly weakened KDP
(Iran), was trying to negotiate with the post-Khomeini, he was
assassinated .65 Sadiq Sharafkandi, Ghassemlou's successor continue to pursue Kurdish autonomy, but against impossible odds.
Iraq has granted the Kurds an "autonomous region," but
its autonomy is insufficient for many Kurdish nationalists. Kurdish nationalist forces have taken up arms against Baghdad
repeatedly, but continue to face a technologically superior military forces. The Kurds were able to control portions of Kurdistan
in Iraq in 1974- 1975 prior to having their external aid cut off
politically via the 1975 Algiers Accord . The Kurds again moved
to seize and control portions of the Kurdish region during the IranIraq War and in 1991 following the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi
forces. 66 In the past Iraqi Kurds have been able to control large
areas of Iraq until the Iraqi forces resorted to sophisticated
weaponry, such as air power and even chemical weapons . Kurdish
nationalist aspirations in Iraq are doomed to be repeatedly defeated tragically , unless significant outside intervention could
shield them from Baghdad. This is politically unlikely . Iraq will
therefore provide Iraqi Kurds with a limited autonomy, insufficient for many nationalistic Kurds.
The Kurds in Turkey have no possibility of achieving
independence or autonomy in the foreseeable future. The overwhelming power of the Turkish state will insure that the Kurds
will be unable to hold cities . Nevertheless, Kurdish unrest might
expand in Eastern Turkey and threaten the government's control,
especially if Kurds receive greater freedoms in neighboring
states. The 1991 move to legalize the Kurdish language in Turkey
is not without significant opposition. 67 The possibility that the ban
on the Kurdish language might be lifted appears to be the first
positive measure for Kurdish nationalism since public order was
established after the Sheikh Said movement. 68 Now it remains
uncertain .
The more modest political goals of the Kurds in Syria and
the Soviet Union appear likely to be realized eventually. The
Syrian Kurds appear to have an improved status in Syria, espe-
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cially after Saddam Hussein came into power in Iraq, possibly
because they can be used as leverage. The Soviet Kurds will have
little chance of carving a new autonomous Kurdistan out of Soviet
Azerbaijan. The Soviet authorities have set up a commission to
improve Kurdish conditions in the Soviet Union. Such a measured
effort might well prove successful.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
The complexity of the Kurdish question complicates
efforts to stabilize the region. The fact that Greater Kurdistan lies
within five states, gives neighboring hostile states a ready made
community to use against opposing governments. Such a Kurdish
constituency or fifth column has been continuously manipulated
by various states for their own national ends. Iran and Iraq have
each supported Kurdish groups in the other. Iraq also has supported Kurdish groups in Turkey . Syria has reportedly supported
Kurdish groups in both Turkey and Iraq .
On several occasions there have been agreements providing for interventions to control ethnic minorities. For example,
July 8, 1937, the Sa'dabad Pact linked Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan, especially to limit transborder activities of ethnic minorities.69 Subsequently several agreements on cooperation between Iran, Iraq, and Turkey have been observed. For instance,
Iraqi-Turkish agreement was signed in August 1981. In May 1983
and again subsequently, Turkey invaded portions of Iraq to stop
Kurdish activities. 70 There remains a real possibility that Turkey
might again invade portions of northern Iraq . If the Iraqi Kurds
would gain an enhanced autonomy or push for independence,
Turkey would probably intervene to prevent its Kurdish population from trying to emulate Iraqi Kurdish successes. Moreover,
the submerged Turkish claim to Mosul might also reemerge.
Similarly, Iraqi Kurdish success could have adestabilizingimpact
upon Iranian Kurds and other minorities in Iran . Iran and Syria
would both be strongly opposed to any intervention by Turkey
into postwar lraq.
The Kurds appear destined to lose again, unless protection of Kurdish basic human rights could be guaranteed through
some international mandate. In such case, an enhanced Kurdish
autonomy in Iraq might well be more desirable to that of a possible
fragmentation of Iraq with competing international interventions.
While Kurdish nationalism has emerged again in Iraq, it appears
that the leftist ideology often espoused by Iraqi Kurdish organizations , might well be the greatest barrier to necessary Western
support even though the Cold War is effectively over. The Kurds
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will continue to face a lack of national unity caused by their
problems of communication and historical separation, as they
pursue their separate national goals. Their political aspirations
appear to be impossible dreams, as the Kurds are relegated to the
role of "stateless nations" whose interests are repeatedly sacrificed for regional stability and the national interest of a number of
host "nationless" states.
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